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glad that we have these four speakers to tell us.
First is Eugene Steuerle,** I cannot think of a better person to
outline the broad outlines of the picture. Dr. Steuerle is such and
even-handed and nonpartisan fellow that he managed to serve under
four presidents on the Treasury Department; and he knows so much
about taxes that even his name means taxes in German.
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND SPOUSES' AND SURVIVORS' BENEFITS
Dr. C. Eugene Steuerle
DR. STEUERLE: In talking about equity towards individuals
and towards women and men, there is one dominating figure that I
want to note. Under the current budget, under President Clinton's
proposal. and under all Republican proposals in Congress right now,
spending, on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, would rise over
the course of the next 60 years, from about 40 percent to about 80
percent of revenues.2 (The last item, Medicaid, is dominated by
growth in costs of long term care.) These numbers do not include
long-term care tax credits, Federal expenditures for civil service and
military retirees and several other items. Basically, we have a Federal
budget that is destined, at least under current law, to be spent almost
entirely on the elderly or near elderly.
3
I am on the leading edge of the "Baby Boom" population as I
was born in 1946. I grew up with a lot of people - whether
conservative or liberal - who were very idealistic about what the
Federal Government should do. I now live with a generation whose
one bequest (whether intended or not) to future generations is a
Federal Government devoted almost solely to its consumption in
Dr. Steuerle is a Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute and the author of
seven books including his most recent: THE GOVERNMENT WE DESERVE.
2 See Eugene Steuerle, Put US. Needs Before Boomers, NEWSDAY, May 18,
1999, available in 1999 WL 8172406.
See Robert H. Binstock, Public Policies on Aging in the Twenty-First
Century, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 311 (1998).
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retirement. In fact, the level of promises in Social Security and health
care together is so great that the average income couple retiring today
is promised, in today's dollars, a little over $500,000 in Social
Security and Medicare benefits.4 Many of the people in this room are
promised close to $1 million in Social Security and Medicare benefits
for themselves and their spouses.5 This comes about partly because
they can expect to get benefits, on average, for about twenty-five
years, until the longer living of the two dies.
6
Now, to the equity issues within the system. My comments
can be succinctly summarized as follows:
1) The treatment of the family within Social Security should
follow from a set of basic principles. There are two principles that I
emphasize. The first relates to meeting needs or achieving
progressivity. For spouses who are divorced persons the reformed
Social Security system should attempt to achieve the goal of meeting
needs by using minimum benefit formulas and adjusting its rate
structure. The second principle is equal justice or horizontal equity.
With respect to couples, this principle emphasizes that couples should
share more or less equally in Social Security benefits that they accrue
for their years together;
2) The treatment of family in today's Social Security program
involves a number of clear-cut inequities and distortions precisely
because it does not flow from a set of principles;
3) Any reform creates winners and losers, and the fear of
creating losers locks Social Security into a partially antiquated
structure toward whom we might be sympathetic;
4) For married, separated, divorced and widowed persons,
conditions in society have changed dramatically over the past few
decades; and
5). Finally, in the case of individual accounts and U.S.A.
4 See Eugene Steuerle, Boomers Can Do Better Than Impoverishing Young,
Hous. CHRON., June 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 3993459.
Id.
6 See Review of Proposal to Revise Social Security: The Impact of Social
Security on Today's Children: Statement Before the Subcomm. on Social Security. on
Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 87-121 (1999) (statement of Eugene Steuerle, Senior
Fellow, Urban Institute).
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accounts, they can be easily split at the time of divorce to try to meet
the goal of horizontal equity or fairness but they generally are not
designed to meet goals of redistribution according to need.
Let me repeat the two equityprinciples that I stated should
apply to Social Security and define its treatment of the family. The
first is the horizontal goal of equal justice: individuals in equal
circumstances should be treated the same. In the case of divorce, for
instance, this generally means that married couples should share fairly
in any accrual of assets during the time of their marriage together.
Given the time constraint, I have dodged defining the word "accrual"
which, as you might guess, can become quite complicated. The
second principle is that benefits should be related to need. Here, I
refer to what is called a vertical equity principle. Social Security,
after all, exists primarily to protect the truly old against poverty. This
leads to such features as the progressive benefit formula and to a
proposal that I suggested as a Commissioner on the National
Commission on Retirement Policy: a wage-indexed minimum benefit
that would ensure that almost all of the elderly would be kept out of
both absolute and relative poverty.
It is important that these two principles not be confused. For
example, a guarantee that a divorced person share fairly in the assets
that derive from his or her former marriage may have nothing at all to
do with need or progressivity but it still may be fair. Similarly, there
are many poor elderly whose condition has nothing to do with
marriage or divorce, so that granting extra benefits to someone simply
because he or she is divorced or married could turn out to be
progressive but neither fair nor well targeted.
Today's Social Security approach, I would argue, can be
likened to the following: think of a major metropolitan city in which
there are many people on the ground who are poor. The Government
responds to this poverty situation by taking a basket of money,
climbing on to the roof of a building and then throwing the money off.
Indeed, some of the money does reach the poor, but some of it also
falls into the penthouses of rich people along the way, and much more
falls into the hands of middle class people who also happen to be on
the ground or living on intervening floors with balconies.
Nonetheless, the poor do receive a fair amount of the money, so that
reform opponents point out, reform would cut back or, at least, reduce
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some of the money gathered by some of the people who are poor on
the ground.
Now, here are some examples of how Social Security treats
families today. The more evenly couples' earnings are split, the more
Social Security reduces their benefits. For example, if one couple's
earnings are split $28,800 and $28,800 rather than $57,600 and zero,
then the former will get substantially lower benefits than the latter.
The differential is even larger when there is a survivor than when both
spouses are alive. Table I demonstrates the different levels of
benefits for families with exactly the same income and exactly the
same contributions to Social Security.
Table 1: Two Earner Couples with Identical Contributions Can
Receive Different Benefits 7
(Annual Benefits for Couples Turning 65 in 1995, in Constant 1993 Dollars)
One Earner Couple, Two-Earner Couple,
husband earns each earns half of
maximum wage maximum taxable
subject to OASI tax wage ($28,800 in
($57,600 in 1993) 1993)
Benefit When Both
Spouses are Alive 20,399 18,229
Benefit When only One
Spouse is Alive 13,599 $9,115
At the margin many secondary workers get absolutely nothing
for their additional contributions to Social Security. (See Table 2.)
For instance, for an average-wage wife of a high-wage husband the
net increase in benefits as a percentage of the net increase in
contributions is almost zero (actually 2.5 percent). This is a much
lower rate of return, by the way, than the highest income workers get
for their additional contributions to Social Security.
7Couples are assumed to be the same age and to retire at age 65.
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Table 2: Effects of Alternative Retirement Decisions on Value of
OASI8
(Workers Turning 65 in 1995; Amounts in Thousands of Constant 1993 Dollars)
Retirement Decision MALE WORKER FEMALE WORKER
Low Average High Low Average High
Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
Retire at 62
Change in benefits -0.2 -0.5 -4.6 -3.6 -6.2 -13.3
Change in contributions -3.2 -7.2 -17.7 -3.3 -7.3 -17.9
Net Gain (+), or Loss(-) +3:1 +6.7 +13.1 -0.3 +1.1 +4.6
Retire at 67
Change in benefits +0.4 -2.8 -8.0 +0.5 -1.7 -4.3
Change in contributions +2.0 +4.3 +10.5 +2.0 +4.5 +10.9
Net Gain (+), or Loss(-) -1.6 -7.2 -18.5 -1.5 -6.2 -15.2
Net OASI tax rate on 8.7% 17.6% 18.8% 8.0% 14.6% 14.8%
wages after 65
Retire at 70
Change in benefits +1.0 -7.4 -22.5 +1.5 -4.7 -13.9
Change in contributions +4.6 +10.2 +24.7 +4.9 +10.8 +26.1
Net Gain (+), or Loss(-) -3.6 -17.6 -47.2 -3.4 -15.5 -40.0
Net OASI tax rate on 8.3% 18.4% 20.3% 7.4% 15.3% 16.3%
wages after 65
8 Table reflects change in actuarial present value of OASI benefits and taxes
to retirement at age 65. All amounts are converted to present value at age 62, using 2
percent real interest rate. Includes impact on worker's benefits only. Those who delay
retirement are assumed to register to begin receiving OASI benefits immediately at age
65. Includes both employer and employee portions of OASI payroll tax. Projections are
based on intermediate assumptions in 1993 OASDI Board of Trustees report. Assumes
OASI tax rate is set at 10.65 percent after 1992.
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If a spouse divorces a worker after nine years, 11 months and
27 days of marriage the spouse gets absolutely nothing from Social
Security in auxiliary benefits and is entitled to no share of the
worker's benefits. On the other hand, if a worker gathers five spouses
over the course of a life, each for ten years and one day of marriage,
then each of the spouses is entitled to up to hundreds of thousands of
dollars in Social Security benefits simply because of the marriages. 9
Social Security grants substantially more benefits to couples whose
ages are widely separated more than to those who happen to be closer
in age. ° If a single head of household raises children and works for
40 years at $10,000 a year and contributes every year to Social
Security, he or she will be entitled to substantially fewer Social
Security benefits than a spouse or a divorced person who never works,
never raises children, and never contributes to Social Security, as long
as that spouse happens to be married to a rich worker for ten years or
more.
Why do these inequities and anomalies arise? They are the
consequence of formulas - for both spousal benefits and benefits for
divorced persons - which are poorly targeted and fail to address
either of the two issues at stake: (a) the well-being of the divorced
spouses, or of anyone else, for that matter and (b) the right of each
spouse to share in the fruit of the household's labors and earnings
during the years of marriage.
Now, what typically stymies reform - this has been
mentioned in the other panels - is that reform inevitably creates
winners and losers. In practice, Congress does not like to identify
losers along the way to reforming a system. The way Congress often
does reform is to put patches on the system. It identifies some new
group which arouses sympathy and then puts another patch on the
system to add new benefits without, necessarily, taking anything away
from other groups. If you then try to reform a system according to a
set of principles, however, you will find some people who are
9 See Legal Separation Isn't Necessary to Draw Benefits, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, KY), March 7, 1999, at 02h.
10See Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging Women and
Social Security Revision, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Eugene Steuerle, Senior
Fellow, Urban Institute), available in LEXIS-CIS Congressional Universe.
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moderately sympathetic who will face some reduction in benefits even
though you have other more sympathetic people who have increases
in benefits.
If we were able to follow principles, in spite of political
incentives to the contrary, how would it work? I would argue that we
consider combining the type of minimum benefit I suggested to the
National Commission on Retirement Policy with a system of either
earnings sharing or benefit sharing for couples - assuming we can
deal with the complication of the latter change. Earnings or benefit
sharing would approximately prorate the benefits of either spouse
according to the share of normal work life of the couple's work life
together. The combined reform might involve some capping of a
spouse's or survivor's benefits, since these benefits give the largest
windfalls to the spouses of the richest workers regardless of their
contribution to the system and regardless of whether they raise
children. As a consequence of those reforms, the system would no
longer provide greater benefits to couples simply because their ages
were farther apart rather than closer together.
A final issue I want to raise has to do with the individual
account or the U.S.A. Account Proposal, the so-called privatization of
the system, whether it is on an add-on or subtraction method. I think
this debate is often confused. The individual account or U.S.A.
account can be designed to meet my second principle, that is, it can be
easily designed to try to allocate shares of assets in accounts between
members of couples. Thus it can meet the horizontal goals very well.
However, it is not well designed, for the most part, to meet vertical
goals or to deal with the needs of those who do not save adequately
and those who, for a variety of other reasons, end up to be poor at
retirement. For those issues you need to rely on other provisions such
as minimum benefits.
What confuses matters, however, is that many people look at
reforms one at a time. For example, if all that happens is that
individual accounts were to replace part of the existing system, then
there probably would be a decrease in progressivity and perhaps a
decrease in benefits for low-income people. On the other hand, you
could increase progressivity if you are willing to combine provisions,
for instance, if you are willing to do some individual accounts but you
are also willing to beef up a minimum benefit to help the poor.
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